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CASENOTES
FRANKLIN v. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE
IMPLICATION OF REMEDIES FOR AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the common law doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium, where
there is a right, there is a remedy.1 The United States Supreme Court has
long recognized the validity of this doctrine.2 Traditionally, the Court was
very liberal in recognizing private rights of action, and granting injunctive
and monetary relief for violations of constitutional and statutory rights in
the absence of explicit congressional authorization.3 In Bell v. Hood, the
Supreme Court stated: "[W]here federally protected rights have been in-
vaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief .... [Flederal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.' 4
1. G.R.C., Case Comment, Implied Private Rights of Action for Damages Under Title IX
- Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 16 GA. L. REV. 511, 511 (1982); see also BLACK'S LAW
DITINARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In this case, the Court stated:
[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . . "[I]t is a gen-
eral and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal rem-
edy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."
Id. at 163 (quoting 3 WmLIAm BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAREs 23).
3. See City of Mitchell v. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co., 246 U.S. 396 (1918); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
The Warren Court was particularly amenable to acknowledging implied causes of action.
Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action For Minorities and the Poor Through Pre-
sumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 970 (1983); see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.").
4. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (granting money damages for the violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights).
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The Burger Court introduced an era of judicial restraint during which
the Court began to take a much more restrictive approach to implying
rights of action in statutes where Congress did not manifest any intent.5
In Cort v. Ash, the Court created a four-prong test for determining when
a private cause of action will be inferred from a statute. The test exam-
ines whether: (1) the statute created a federal right in favor of the plain-
tiff; (2) there is any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to
create or deny such a remedy; (3) the remedy would be consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) the cause of
action has traditionally been relegated to state law.6 "Cort implied that
the mere existence of a right was not enough to enable the plaintiff to
sue, and that courts would not enforce rights absent congressional intent
to create remedy."'7
As applied to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,8 the ubi
jus, ibi remedium doctrine has significantly impacted the ability of plain-
tiffs suing under Title IX to combat sexual discrimination by federally
funded educational programs." Most importantly, the recent Supreme
Court decision of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools'0 estab-
lished that compensatory damages are an available remedy in private law-
suits brought to enforce Title IX despite the absence of statutory
authorization.1
This Casenote explores the Franklin Court's recognition of compensa-
tory damages under Title IX and the effect this decision will have on
victims and perpetrators of intentional sexual discrimination in federally
5. Ronfeldt, supra note 3, at 970; see, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bar-
bour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passen-
gers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
6. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
7. Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Reme-
dies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1075 (1992).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). The text of the statute provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id. § 1681(a).
9. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), for example, the Supreme
Court held that a private right of action exists for plaintiffs alleging sexual discrimination
by a federally funded academic institution. For a more detailed discussion of Cannon, see
infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
10. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
11. Prior to Franklin, the lower federal courts were irreconcilably divided on the issue of
whether monetary damages were an appropriate remedy to be implied under Title IX. Com-
pare Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that com-
pensatory relief is available under Title IX) with Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that compensatory damages are not recoverable
under Title IX), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) and Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660
F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that injunctive and declaratory relief are the only reme-
dies available under Title IX), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
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funded educational institutions. Section H describes the legislative his-
tory and analyzes the relevant statutory language of Title IX. Section III
discusses case law addressing the availability of damages under Title IX
prior to the Franklin decision. Section IV reviews and analyzes the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Franklin. Finally, Section V predicts the effect
Franklin will have on discrimination in all federally funded programs and
on the interpretation of other statutes that do not provide a private right
of action for compensatory damages.
II. TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197212 in
response to growing awareness of gender based discrimination in federally
funded educational programs.18 Originally, Congress considered amending
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 through a bil 1 5 which simply
added the word "sex" to the list of discriminations already prohibited by
section 601 of Title VI.16 However, Congress determined that the problem
of gender discrimination in education possessed issues worthy of a sepa-
rate comprehensive measure. 7 For example, discrimination by academic
institutions was considered particularly destructive because education
provides access to jobs and financial security.18  Furthermore,
"[d]iscrimination against women, in contrast to that against minorities,
[was] still overt and socially acceptable within the academic commu-
12. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1988)).
13. See 118 CONG. REc. 5803-15 (1972).
14. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988)). The statute states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." Id.
15. H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
16. Although Congress never passed this bill, the supporting evidence was reconsidered
during the next legislative session when Title IX was proposed.
17. 118 CONG. REC. 5803-06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Even though Congress found
Title IX was worthy of a separate provision, the language of Title VI differs from Title IX
in only two respects. First, the grounds of discrimination prohibited under Title VI are
"race, color, or national origin," whereas "sex" is the only protected classification under
Title IX. Additionally, where Title VI prohibits discrimination in "any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance," Title IX focuses exclusively on discrimination in
only education programs receiving Federal financial assistance.
18. Id. at 5804. For analysis of the unique issues relating specifically to sex discrimination
in post-secondary education see Christine Maitland, The Inequitable Treatment of Women
Faculty in Higher Education, in WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
246 (Lynne B. Welch ed., 1990) and BETTY RICHARDSON, SEXISM IN HIGHER EDUCATION
(1979).
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nity."' 9 Consequently, Congress created Title IX to cover situations
unique to the educational arena, such as admissions procedures, scholar-
ships, and faculty employment. 20
Although Congress never questioned the necessity for legislation to
combat sex discrimination in federally funded academic institutions, "vig-
orous debate ensued over what exemptions should be allowed, particu-
larly over the admissions policies of religious, military, secondary, and
private undergraduate institutions. '21 As a result, the current version of
Title IX incorporates a list of exempt organizations, 22 including religious
organizations if application of Title IX would be inconsistent with the
tenets of such organizations, 2 military schools, 24 certain single sex insti-
tutions, 25 social fraternities and sororities or voluntary youth organiza-
tions,28 Boys State and Girls State conferences, 27 father/son or mother/
daughter activities,28 and scholarships for beauty pageants.29 Despite
these limitations, Title IX represents a broad ban on sex discrimination
in federally funded educational programs.30
Congress designed Title IX to achieve two specific objectives: to pre-
vent the distribution of federal funds to educational institutions engaging
in sexual discrimination; and to protect individuals from such practices.3 1
The drafters of Title IX applied the same enforcement mechanisms used
in Title VI to pursue these goals.32 Any student, employee or job appli-
cant having a complaint of sexual discrimination or harassment3 s has two
19. 118 CONG. REC. at 5804 (quoting a study by an independent task force formed by the
Ford Foundation, reported in March 1971).
20. Id. at 5803.
21. Roak J. Parker, Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 68 EDuc. L. REP. 557, 559 (West 1991).
22. No similar list exists under Title VI which applies to all federally funded programs
and activities.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1988).
24. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
25. Id. § 1681(a)(5).
26. Id. § 1681(a)(6).
27. Id. § 1681(a)(7).
28. Id. § 1681(a)(8).
29. Id. § 1681(a)(9).
30. Parker, supra note 21, at 559.
31. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see also Pamela W. Kernie,
Protecting Individuals From Sex Discrimination: Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 67 WASH. L. Rzv. 155, 156-57 (1992).
32. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988) with 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988). Congress also ap-
plied the same language to statutory provisions addressing discrimination on the bases of
age and handicap by federal grant recipients. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)); Age Discrimina-
tion Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, § 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6102
(1988)).
33. Sexual discrimination has been interpreted in several forums to include sexual harass-
ment which creates a hostile environment. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
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options. First, the victim may utilize specific grievance procedures re-
quired of programs receiving federal financial assistance.3 4 Alternatively,
the regulations provide a grievance procedure with the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) whereby OCR investigates the complaint and terminates
funding if "compliance with [Title IX] cannot be secured by voluntary
means."
3 5
Although both of these mechanisms work toward achieving the goals of
Title IX, neither remedy is sufficient to meet these goals. The reality is
that the OCR is unlikely to withdraw federal funding from any educa-
tional institution. The legislative history manifests an expectation that
funding will be withdrawn only in the most extreme cases,38 and the regu-
lations specifically require that all investigations be settled by "informal
means whenever possible. ' 37 Therefore, in most instances, the OCR only
requires assurances of future compliance with Title IX.
Under these options, the most a victim can hope for is that school offi-
cials will work to correct the behavior in question. At worst, the victim
suffers discrimination without relief and the program loses federal fund-
ing. These administrative procedures provide little protection to a victim
of sexual discrimination because they fail to guarantee any remedy, in-
cluding immediate official intervention or compensation for damages.
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992); EEOC Sexual Harass-
ment Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1991). Contra Bougher v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 882 F.2d 74 (1989) ("Title IX simply
does not permit a 'hostile environment' claim as described for the workplace by 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(3).").
34. Each recipient institution must appoint at least one employee to organize and effectu-
ate compliance with Title IX, including establishing grievance procedures for "the prompt
and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which
would be prohibited by [Title IX]." 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (1991).
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1991) (incorporating by reference the procedural provisions appli-
cable to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)-(d) (1991); cf. 20
U.S.C. § 1682 (1988). See generally Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher
Education, 65 TEx. L. REV. 525 (1987).
36. In reference to Title VI, Senator Ribicoff stated:
I think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut off. In most cases
alternative remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination, would be the prefera-
ble and more effective remedy. If a Negro child were kept out of a school receiving
Federal funds, I think it would be better to get the Negro child into school than to
cut off funds and impair the education of the white children.
110 CONG. REc. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d) (1991) (applies to enforcement of Title IX pursuant to 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.71 (1991)).
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III. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER TITLE IX
A. Cannon v. University of Chicago
Although Congress did not expressly authorize a private right of action
for victims alleging discrimination in the language of Title IX, the Su-
preme Court has implied one. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,38 the
plaintiff alleged that she was denied admission to medical school because
of her sex. 9 The Seventh Circuit refused to imply a private right of ac-
tion, stating that Congress intended the administrative remedies to be the
exclusive means of enforcement of Title IX.40 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the petitioner did have a right under Title IX to
pursue her claim of sexual discrimination in the courts.41
The Court applied the four-part test created in Cort v. Ash 42 to deter-
mine whether a private cause of action could be inferred from a statute.
First, the Court examined the plain language of Title IX to determine
whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which
the plaintiff was a member.43 Distinguishing between statutes enacted for
the protection of the general public, such as criminal statutes, and those
which expressly identify the class Congress intended to benefit, the Court
concluded that Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit on persons discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex.41
Second, the Court considered the legislative history of Title IX to de-
termine whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.45
In particular, the Court acknowledged that the drafters of Title IX had
directly patterned Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
38. 44 U.S. 677 (1979), rev'g 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
39. Plaintiff was denied admission to the University of Chicago and Northwestern Uni-
versity even though she satisfied the criteria for admission to both universities. She alleged
that policies against admitting students over 30 years old were discriminatory against
women because a greater percentage of women have their higher education interrupted, and
age is not a valid indication of success in the medical field. Id. at 680 nn.1-2. Plaintiff also
submitted statistics showing that both schools "accepted a far smaller percentage of women
than their percentage in the general population and in the class of persons with bachelor's
degrees." Id. n.2.
Note, however, that the defense submitted evidence that at least 2,000 applicants who
were more qualified than the plaintiff had been denied admission. Cannon, 559 F.2d at
1067.
40. 559 F.2d at 1073.
41. 441 U.S. at 689.
42. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a description of the Cort analysis see supra note 6-7 and
accompanying text.
43. 441 U.S. at 689-94.
44. Id. at 690-94.
45. Id. at 694-703.
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1964,," included the same enforcement mechanisms,4 and explicitly rec-
ognized that it would be interpreted and applied in the same manner as
Title VI.4 s The Court assumed that the lawmakers were aware of the cur-
rent state of the law, thereby knowing that the relevant language in Title
VI had already been interpreted to include a private remedy when Title
IX was enacted.49 The Court also noted the liberal approach the courts
took regarding implied causes of action during the years immediately pre-
ceding the passage of Title IX.5o The majority stated that Title IX was
passed prior to the decision in Cort, which called for stricter scrutiny
when implying private rights of action.5'
Third, the Court considered whether a private cause of action would
hinder or advance the objectives of Title IX.5 ' Although the statutorily
authorized removal of federal funds does prevent the use of federal funds
to support discriminatory practices, the Court recognized that this prac-
tice does little to protect victims from these practices. It stated that
"[t]he award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted
her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with - and in
some cases even necessary to - the orderly enforcement of the statute."'
'5
The Court concluded the Cort analysis by stating that the implication
of a federal right was not improper on grounds that it conflicted with an
area of particular concern to the states.54 The Court noted that "[s]ince
the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal courts have been
46. The Court noted that Congress originally considered amending Title VI to prohibit
gender based discrimination in federally funded educational institutions. Id. at 694-95 n.16
(referring to H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
47. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
48. 441 U.S. at 696. The Court noted that during the debates on the Senate Floor, Sen.
Bayh stated that "'[t]he same [enforcement] procedure that was set up and has operated
with great success under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the regulations thereunder[,] would
be equally applicable to discrimination [prohibited by Title IX]."' Id. n.19 (quoting 117
CONG. REC. 30408 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh)) (alteration in original).
49. Id. at 696-97 (relying primarily on the Fifth Circuit opinion in Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.
v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967)). The Court also
noted that at least three other district courts had explicitly relied on Title VI as the basis
for a private right of action for victims of discrimination, specifically: Blackshear Residents
Org. v. Housing Auth. of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Hawthorne v.
Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Va. 1972); Gautreaux v. Chi-
cago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. IMI. 1967). Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.21.
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
51. 441 U.S. at 698-99 ("We, of course, adhere to the strict approach followed in our
recent cases, but our evaluation of congressional action in 1972 must take into account its
contemporary legal context.").
52. Id. at 703-08.
53. Id. at 705-06.
54. Id. at 708.
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the 'primary and powerful reliances' in protecting citizens against [invidi-
ous] discrimination" of any sort.55
Each factor of the Cort analysis supported the implication of a private
right of action. Indeed, the Court concluded that "[n]ot only the words
and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and underlying pur-
poses, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims
of discrimination."" By recognizing an implied right of action for the en-
forcement of Title IX, the Supreme Court provided victims of discrimina-
tion with an alternative to the federal administrative enforcement
scheme. ,
Although Cannon authorized a private right of action for injunctive re-
lief and Congress recently had granted prevailing parties the right to at-
torneys' fees under Title IX,57 no authority had recognized a victim's
right to receive compensation for damages from discrimination.5
B. Lieberman v. University of Chicago
In Lieberman v. University of Chicago,59 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals again addressed alleged discriminatory practices by the Univer-
sity of Chicago. The plaintiff, a resident of the Chicago area, was forced
to relocate in order to attend medical school when denied admission to
the university. In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, she sought
compensatory damages for moving expenses, pain and suffering and loss
of consortium.60 The court interpreted Cannon very narrowly and held
that damages were not available.
Specifically, the majority relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman 6 which mandated a
55. Id. at 708 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974)) (emphasis in
original).
56. Id. at 709. The Court stated that the lower court's application of the Cort test yielded
an incorrect answer. It is interesting to note that when the court of appeals analyzed the
legislative history of Title IX, it found that "none of the Congressmen envisioned the rather
drastic remedy of individual lawsuits." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1063
(7th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court, on the other hand, made extensive reference to com-
ments made in Congress which indicated an expectation that a private remedy would be
available. 441 U.S. at 696-705.
57. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of ... Title IX ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
58. The availability of relief and the nature of relief available are separate issues. Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
59. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
60. Id. at 1186.
61. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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narrow interpretation of remedies under Spending Clause statutes, such
as Title IX."2 The Lieberman court explained that:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Power is much in the nature
of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate
under the Spending Power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract.""3
Therefore, unless the recipient knew it might be exposed to liability, it
did not "knowingly" accept the terms of the "contract." Consequently,
the Lieberman court stated that the remedies available under a Cannon
right of action should be narrowly construed. The court wrote that "[i]f a
damages remedy is to be created, it should be fashioned by Congress and
not by the Courts, thus providing the institutions with ample notice and
an opportunity to reconsider their acceptance of financial aid.' ' " Thus,
according to the Seventh Circuit, the only remedies available under Title
IX are injunctive and declaratory relief.
C. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission
In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n,6 5 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of availability of damages under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.8 Black and Hispanic police officers brought a class
action suit in federal court alleging violations of their rights under Title
VI. The complaint centered on examinations administered by the New
York City Police Department that were used to determine appointments
to the police force and the order in which appointments were made. Be-
cause Blacks and Hispanics typically earned the lowest scores on the test,
they were the last hired and the first laid-off.6 7 Acknowledging that the
examinations had a discriminatory impact on the appellants, a plurality
of the Court held that plaintiffs alleging unintentional discrimination
under Title VI and Title IX are limited solely to prospective relief.68
Like the Seventh Circuit in Lieberman, the Supreme Court in Guardi-
ans declined to find a damages remedy for an implied cause of action
62. Id. at 29-30.
63. 660 F.2d at 1187 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
64. Id. at 1188.
65. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
66. Although the case dealt with violations of Title VI rather than Title IX, the Title VI
analysis automatically applies to Title IX because the Supreme Court has determined that
Congress "explicitly assumed" the two statutes would be interpreted the same way. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 697 (1979).
67. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 585.
68. Id. at 593.
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under a Spending Clause statute,s especially where the Court had al-
ready determined that the statute "does not of its own force proscribe
unintentional racial discrimination. '70 Still, the Guardians decision failed
to clarify precisely the remedies available under Title VI or Title IX.7 1
Although a majority of the justices recognized the availability of compen-
satory relief for intentional violations of Title VI, Justices White and
Rehnquist did only in dictuM.7 2 Three others, Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Marshall, addressed this issue in dissents.7 3 "Thus a restrictive
reading of Guardians does not allow for compensatory relief, even given a
showing of intent. 7 4 Subsequent interpretations of the Guardians deci-
sion resulted in conflicting decisions by the Third and Eleventh Circuits
on the availability of damages to plaintiffs proving intentional
discrimination.7 5
D. The Pfeiffer - Franklin Split
In Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District,7 6 a former student
sued the school board and members of the faculty council of the local
chapter of the National Honor Society (NHS) alleging sexual discrimina-
'tion in her dismissal from the NHS.7 7 The plaintiff sought an injunction
69. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
70. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 590 (citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)).
71. Parker, supra note 21, at 558. The Supreme Court clarified the issue somewhat in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), by holding that the respondent
could recover back pay as a remedy for a suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
72. Justice White noted:
In cases where intentional discrimination has been shown, there can be no question as
to what the recipient's obligation under the program was and so no question that the
recipient was aware of that obligation. In such situations, it may be that the victim of
the intentional discrimination should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as
to prospective relief in the event the State continues with the program.
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597.
73. Justice Stevens argued that intent is a necessary element of a valid Title VI claim, but
that there is no justification for limiting victims of intentional discrimination to prospective
relief. Id. at 635-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that intent is not
an essential component for a Title VI violation and that compensatory relief is available for
both intentional and unintentional violations of Title VI. Id. at 615-34 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
74. Parker, supra note 21, at 564.
75. Cf. Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). See
generally infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
76. 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
77. Plaintiff, an unmarried student, was a member in good standing of the National
Honor Society. Upon discovering that she was pregnant, the faculty council of the local
chapter unanimously voted to dismiss Pfeiffer for failing "to uphold the high standards of
leadership and character required for admission and maintenance of membership." Id. at
782. Appellant based her claim of discrimination on the grounds that no male member had
[Vol. 27:131
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reinstating her to the NHS, a correction of school records, and compensa-
tory and punitive damages.78 Though most of her demands became moot
when the NHS local chapter disbanded and was removed as a party to
the suit, the court still considered the availability of damages. Relying
primarily on Cannon and Lieberman, the district court denied plaintiff
compensatory damages, holding that victims of discrimination under Ti-
tle IX are entitled only to injunctive and declaratory relief.79 The Third
Circuit reversed, relying on the Guardians Court's interpretation of Title
VI,s° and concluded that compensatory relief was available when a plain-
tiff alleges and establishes discriminatory intent.""
The Pfeiffer court admitted that it reached this decision "not without
some difficulty"' 2 and recognized that its decision was contrary to deci-
sions reached by the Seventh" and Eleventh Circuits.8 Although the con-
tradiction with the Seventh Circuit is distinguishable on the grounds that
the Seventh Circuit decisions were made prior to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Guardians, the Eleventh Circuit in Franklin v. Gwinnett-
County Public Schools,85 presented an irreconcilable contradiction be-
tween the federal circuits.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,s ' a high school student
reported allegations of prolonged sexual harassment and abuse by one of
her teachers to school board officials. She also complained that the school
band director knew of the situation but failed to intervene and "tried to
discourage her from pursuing the matter by talking to her about the neg-
ative publicity which could result. '87 After the school board began to in-
vestigate Franklin's allegations, the teacher resigned and the band direc-
ever been dismissed for premarital sexual activity, including a member who impregnated his
girlfriend two years after Pfeiffer's dismissal. After excluding the evidence of the male stu-
dent's treatment, the district court made a factual finding, undisturbed on appeal, that ap-
pellant had been dismissed for failure to uphold the standards of the NHS by engaging in
premarital sexual intercourse, not for becoming pregnant. Id. at 783.
78. Id. at 783.
79. Id. at 787.
80. "In Cannon, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress intended to create remedies
in Title IX comparable to those available under Title VI. We thus look to guidance from the
Supreme Court in cases involving Title IX and its statutory predecessor, Title VI." Id.
81. Id. at 788-89. See Kernie, supra note 31, at 164 nn.70-72 for similar holdings by other
courts. Note that "[t]he court stopped short of defining what types of damages the plaintiff
might be entitled to if she prevailed in her suit." Id.
82. 917 F.2d at 788.
83. See Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical Sch., 710 F.2d 351
(7th Cir. 1983); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
84. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 617.
87. Id. at 618-19.
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tor retired. Nevertheless, Franklin filed a complaint against Gwinnett
County Public Schools (Gwinnett) with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
of the United States Department of Education. Although Gwinnett was
found guilty of sexually discriminating against Franklin in violation of
Title IX, OCR closed the file upon assurances by Gwinnett that it had
taken affirmative action to prevent any future violations 58 Franklin then
filed a private action under Title IX seeking damages for intentional
discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the case, stating that damages are unavailable under both Title
VI and Title IX. 9 While accepting the Supreme Court's ruling in Cannon
that a private cause of action exists under Title IX, the court looked to
local precedent for determining the nature of available remedies and
found that the "'private right of action allowed under Title VI [and Title
IX] encompasses no more than an attempt to have any discriminatory
activity ceased.' ,9 Rejecting Franklin's argument that the Supreme
Court decision in Guardians implicitly overruled this position, the court
held that the issue of whether compensatory damages are available for
intentional discrimination was left open by the plurality opinion in
Guardians. The court concluded that "the inferior courts are free,
checked only by the constraints within their respective spheres of author-
ity, to act as they deem appropriate."91
IV. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES A STAND
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools to resolve the con-
flict between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.92 Applying the general
rule that "all appropriate relief is available in an action brought to vindi-
cate a federal right when Congress has given no indication of its purpose
with respect to remedies,"93 the Court reversed and concluded that dam-
ages are an available remedy for intentional violations of Title IX.
In analyzing congressional intent concerning any limitations on the
available remedies under Title IX, the Court looked solely to post-Can-
88. Id. at 619.
89. Id. at 619-22.
90. Id. at 620 (quoting Drayden v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir.
Unit A April 1981)). Note that on October 1, 1981, the Fifth Circuit was divided to create
the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Therefore, all pre-October 1981 Fifth Circuit decisions
are precedent for the Eleventh Circuit.
91. Id. at 621.
92. 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1992).
93. Id. at 1034. The Court could not be persuaded that this presumption had eroded since
the decision in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 27:131142
FRANKLIN V. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
non legislative history. 4 It noted that although Congress did not explic-
itly recognize a remedy for damages under Title IX when originally en-
acted, Congress amended Title IX subsequent to the Cannon v.
University of Chicago decision.9 5 Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title IX in the Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Amendment of 1986.6 Congress also expanded the coverage
of the anti-discrimination provisions under Title IX in the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 .7 Significantly, the Restoration Act provision di-
rectly controverted an earlier Supreme Court decision.98 In the absence of
a similar restriction on the Cannon holding or on the traditional rule im-
plying all appropriate remedies, the Franklin Court found it reasonable
to assume that congressional intent was not contrary to the implication of
reasonable remedies.9
9
The Court was not persuaded by argument that the award of damages
under Title IX would violate separation of powers principles by "unduly"
expanding the judicial authority into an area reserved to the other
branches. 10 0 Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, the Court
found that this analysis was an unfounded challenge to the longstanding
doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium.10° The Court went a step further and
stated that a failure to provide a remedy in this case would actually vio-
late the separation of powers doctrine by "giving judges the power to
render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress."'0 2
The Court acknowledged the Pennhurst presumption which states that
remedies under Spending Clause legislation are limited when an alleged
violation is unintentional.10 3 The Court explained that when a violation is
unintentional, the entity receiving the federal funding may lack notice
94. 112 S. Ct. at 1035-36. "Because the cause of action was inferred by the Court in Can-
non, the usual recourse to statutory text and legislative history in the period prior to that
decision necessarily will not enlighten our analysis." Id. at 1035.
95. Id. at 1036.
96. Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)).
97. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
98. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
99. 112 S. Ct. at 1036-37. "The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendments of 1986
must be read ... not only 'as a validation of Cannon's holding' but also as an implicit
acknowledgement that damages are available." Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
100. Id. at 1037 ("Unlike finding a cause of action which authorizes a court to hear a case
or controversy, the discretion to award appropriate relief involves no such increase in judi-
cial power.").
101. The Court stated that "properly understood, respondents' position invites us to ab-
dicate our historic judicial authority to award appropriate relief in cases brought in our
court system." Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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that it will be liable for a monetary judgment.0 4 However, the Court de-
clined to apply the same presumption to intentional violations of a
Spending Clause legislation where notice to the recipient is not an issue.
The Court stated that "[u]nquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwin-
nett County Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex....
Congress surely did not intend for federal monies to be expended to sup-
port the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe." 10 5
Finally, the Court refused to hold that the remedies available under
Title IX should be limited to the equitable remedies of back pay and
prospective relief.106 First, to require equitable remedies automatically,
without considering the adequacy of legal remedies, contradicts the tradi-
tional approach in determining the appropriate remedy for the violation
of a federal right.107 Second, and more importantly, although back pay
and prospective relief may be adequate remedies for a victimized em-
ployee, the Court noted that neither remedy afforded relief to Franklin, a
student at the time of the discrimination. As a student, she is not eligible
to receive any back pay, and because Franklin and both of the offending
individuals had already left the school system, prospective relief could
not provide her any remedy.108
The concurring opinion expressed concern about the expansive lan-
guage used in the majority's opinion. The concurring Justices did not dis-
pute the traditional presumption implying appropriate remedies when
Congress expressly creates a cause of action or when Congress creates a
cause of action "by clear textual implication."109 However, when the
Court derives a private right of action from mere "contextual evidence,"
the concurring opinion stated that the Court cannot automatically as-
sume the availability of all appropriate remedies in the absence of con-
104. 112 S. Ct. at 1037. Note that the Court did not refer to its decision in Guardians as
authority for this proposition.
105. Id. ("[M]oreover, the notion that Spending Clause statutes do not authorize mone-
tary awards for intentional violations is belied by our unanimous holding in Darrone.").
106. Id. at 1038.
107. Id. (referring to Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891)).
108. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he government's answer that administrative action
helps other similarly-situated students in effect acknowledges that its approach would leave
petitioner remediless." Id. Although injunctive relief would not have been beneficial to
Franklin, the Court failed to mention that Franklin could have pursued other alternatives.
Though Franklin did not have a right under Title IX to proceed against an individual guilty
of the sexual discrimination, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 622 n.9
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (citing Leake v. University of Cincin-
nati, 605 F.2d 255, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1979)), she was able to seek alternate remedies under
state law. In fact, Franklin and her mother have brought an action in state court against the
teacher for "seduction." See Franklin v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Another
suit was filed in federal court against Gwinnett County Public Schools and the band direc-
tor. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., No. 1:88-cv-2922-ODE.
109. 112 S. Ct. at 1038 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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gressional limitation. "To require, with respect to a right that is not con-
sciously and intentionally created, that any limitation of remedies must
be express, is to provide, in effect, that the most questionable of private
rights will also be the most expansively remediable." 110 Nevertheless, the
concurring Justices agreed that the presumption of all available remedies
under Title IX was appropriate in light of the extensive legislative history
demonstrating an implicit acknowledgement that Congress intended a
damages remedy to be available.""'
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FRANKLIN
According to Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, a damages
remedy is available to plaintiffs bringing suit to enforce Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. On a very specific level, the holding is
expected to enhance the effectiveness of Title IX and other civil rights
legislation.11 2 On a more general level, the broad language of the majority
opinion creates concern that Franklin signals that the Court win take a
liberal approach in approving remedies for implied rights of action.
A. The Impact of Franklin on Intentional Discrimination by Federally
Funded Education Programs
Congress drafted Title IX to promote the two interrelated objectives of
preventing the distribution of federal funds to educational programs en-
gaging in gender discrimination and protecting individuals against such
discrimination."1 Congress bolstered these objectives by imposing a disin-
centive to discriminatory behavior by threatening withdrawal of federal
funding and by requiring the offending institution to create grievance
procedures.11 4 These enforcement mechanisms are insufficient because
they fail to provide any real threat to institutions and they do little to
protect victims from discrimination. For example, enforcement by the
OCR may be limited depending on the resources available to the agency,
or according to the incumbent administration's willingness to actively
protect civil rights. Also, the required grievance procedures may be
equivalent to the fox guarding the hen house. Administrative or injunc-
tive remedies rarely offer victims incentive to take the risks associated
with filing discrimination claims.11 5 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court
110. Id. at 1039.
111. Id. ("lit is too late in the day to address whether a judicially implied exclusion of
damages under Title IX would be appropriate.").
112. Kernie, supra note 31, at 156.
113. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
115. Plaintiffs bringing a discrimination case under Title IX may face negative pressures
from within their academic community if the lawsuit threatens to ruin the careers of
respected persons or may result in the educational program losing federal funding. Addi-
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noted in Cannon, there are situations in which "it makes little sense to
impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for
herself, or on HEW, the burden of demonstrating that an institution's
practices are so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of fed-
eral funding is appropriate."'116
However, allowing plaintiffs to sue for compensatory damages furthers
the goals of Title IX by increasing the likelihood that violations of Title
IX are more diligently investigated and by discouraging future violations.
A damages remedy allows victims to "bring a private suit in hopes of re-
dressing wrongs done to them as individuals." 1 7 Compensation prevents
plaintiffs from being left remediless in the event that prescriptive relief
would be of no value.118 Allowing victims to pursue their own actions as
private attorneys general ensures that their concerns will be actively
addressed.119
Providing plaintiffs with damages should also have a chilling effect on
the willingness of these programs to practice discrimination. Offering vic-
tims an incentive to pursue violations of their rights increases the likeli-
hood that violations will be reported, thus warning programs that such
activity will not be tolerated. If discriminatory institutions face monetary
liability for their actions, they will be more likely to take their responsi-
bilities seriously.120
Although Franklin has the potential to increase the number of Title IX
suits filed, the decision should not be criticized on the grounds that it
unjustifiably or unnecessarily threatens school budgets or opens the fed-
eral courts to unsanctioned litigation. 12 After all, the practical impact of
tionally, at trial, victims "may be forced to air their dirty laundry and to relive embarrassing
or painful moments." Kernie, supra note 31, at 166.
116. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 705 (1979).
117. Kernie, supra note 31, at 160.
118. Id. at 167. Due to the highly transitory nature of students and faculty in the educa-
tional setting, injunctive relief alone can rarely redress the injury.
119. In Cannon, the Court responded at length to allegations that private litigation will
interfere with the enforcement of Title IX. 441 U.S. at 706 n.41. The Court stated that
under the facts of that case there was no such threat, but "if the possibility of interference
arises in another case, appropriate action can be taken by the relevant court at that time."
Id. In analyzing congressional intent on this issue, the Court determined that Congress was
not concerned with such interference when it enacted Title IX. Likewise, the Court was not
"persuaded that individual suits are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of remedies.
Because the individual complainants cannot assure themselves that the administrative pro-
cess will reach a decision on their complaints within reasonable time, it makes little sense to
require exhaustion." Id. at 707-08 n.41.
120. Kernie, supra note 31, at 168-69.
121. For example, concerned with the dangers of exposing schools to "massive financial
liability," the Bush administration pressured the Court not to allow damages in the Frank-
lin decision. Geoffrey A. Campbell, Around the Nation, BOND BUR, Mar. 3, 1992, at 28;
see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 38.
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the decision can be avoided simply by increasing liability insurance pre-
miunms or by abolishing gender-based discrimination. Moreover, a per-
ceived susceptibility to unwarranted litigation should not be grounds for
refusing to remedy violations of a right.122 The courts have long recog-
nized the validity of remedying injuries though they are easy to allege and
difficult to prove.12 3
In any event, the Franklin decision is not likely to encourage unjusti-
fied litigation. Although a damages remedy offers victims the incentive to
come forward with complaints of sexual discrimination, it does not pro-
vide litigious individuals the incentive to falsify allegations. Franklin only
recognized the availability of compensatory damages;12 4 it did not guaran-
tee this remedy to every victim claiming discrimination. In order to re-
ceive damages a plaintiff must be able to prove intentional discrimina-
tion, demonstrate the appropriateness of a damages remedy, and prove
that the damages were caused by the discrimination. For instance, in
Franklin, compensatory damages were appropriate because plaintiff was a
student who could not be compensated in any other way. A sagacious in-
terpretation of the Franklin approach, therefore, requires a substantial
showing that the remedy sought is appropriate.
Furthermore, the Franklin Court only discussed compensatory dam-
ages. It did not recognize the availability of future or punitive damages or
compensation for pain and suffering. Admittedly, however, the Franklin
analysis portended that these types of damages will be available upon a
showing of their appropriateness.225 Finally, the decision did nothing to
122. The burden on judicial resources should have been considered by Congress when
passing the legislation. As Justice Harlan wrote in his concurring opinion in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics:
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless,
when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly
express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally pro-
tected interests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts
arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the way of
the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles.
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
123. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 239 (1988) ("While there is some theoretical
difficulty in awarding dollars for pain and suffering ... the law is clear that an award for
pain and suffering is a proper element in plaintiff's recovery for personal physical injuries
tortiously inflicted.").
124. The Court in Franklin remanded the case back to the district court for determina-
tion of the factual issues. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038
(1992).
125. But see Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1992). In apply-
ing Franklin to the Rehabilitation Act, the court made only a cursory examination of
whether compensatory damages for loss of professional opportunity, mental anguish and
pain and suffering were appropriate for an employee. Tanberg failed to note that in Frank-
lin, remedies available to employees were not appropriate for Franklin, a student.
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alleviate the negative ramifications of bringing such a suit; it only pro-
vided the incentive to pursue a claim despite negative consequences.
B. Future Application of the Franklin Approach
Franklin certainly will have implications for the enforcement of other
anti-discrimination statutes.128 In fact, the decision has already served as
the basis for an award of compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation
Act." 7 However, it is unclear whether Franklin stands for the proposition
that compensatory damages are available under all implied rights of ac-
tion when Congress failed to express a limitation on the remedies
available.
Applying the traditional approach of implying remedies,"2 8 the Frank-
lin majority presumed the availability of all appropriate remedies in the
absence of contrary congressional intent."29 Title IX's particular legisla-
tive history made application of the traditional presumption appropriate.
Title IX is part of the distinct group of anti-discrimination statutes that
have a rather peculiar legislative history. As the Franklin Court noted,
Congress passed the legislation when the judiciary was liberally interpret-
ing statutory rights, and Congress did not take advantage of subsequent
opportunities to limit or alter Supreme Court interpretation of the stat-
ute. 30 Consequently, there was little doubt that Congress approved of the
implied right of action and the availability of appropriate remedies, in-
cluding damages.
Although applying the traditional presumption was appropriate in light
of the distinct legislative history of Title IX, there may be some question
as to whether the same is true of other statutes from which courts have
implied private rights of action. As the United States argued in Franklin,
"there is no justification for treating [congressional] silence as the
equivalent of the broadest imaginable grant of remedial authority."' s Ar-
guably, where Congress did not explicitly confer a private right of action
it cannot be assumed Congress approves of all remedies under a private
right of action inferred after the statute was enacted. The concurring
opinion in Franklin stated that to argue otherwise is the equivalent of
stating that "unless Congress expressly legislates a more limited remedial
policy with respect to rights of action it does not know it is creating, it
intends the full gamut of remedies to be applied.' 2 Therefore, a con-
126. See supra notes 32, 66 and accompanying text.
127. Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1992).
128. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
129. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1992).
130. Id. at 1036.
131. Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae).
132. Id. at 1039.
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servative reading of Franklin would require some showing of congres-
sional intent 33 before the courts will automatically presume the availabil-
ity of all appropriate remedies for implied rights of action.
13 4
The first decision to rely on Franklin for the implication of remedies
demonstrates that the decision will perhaps be read more liberally than
the above analysis suggests. In Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff,3 5 the
court relied on Franklin to find that compensatory damages are available
under the Rehabilitation Act.113 Rather than relying on the well-estab-
lished fact that interpretations of Title IX apply automatically to the Re-
habilitation Act,13 7 the Tanberg court instead relied on Franklin for the
general proposition that if Congress did not specify the relief obtainable
or expressly disallow compensatory damages, any appropriate relief is
available.1 38 Therefore, while correct in finding that damages are available
under the Rehabilitation Act, the Tanberg decision offers a misleading
interpretation of the Franklin decision. When applying Franklin to stat-
utes without this distinct .legislative history surrounding the anti-discrim-
ination statutes, courts must make a more detailed analysis of legislative
history than undertaken by the Tanberg court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin stands for the proposition
that programs receiving federal funding now face liability for intention-
ally discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, because the Franklin decision
is based on a narrow fact pattern, it should not necessarily be interpreted
to mean that the Supreme Court is conciliatory to the liberal implication
of damages for every implied right of action where Congress has failed to
provide limitations on the remedies available.
Ellen F. Firsching
133. The precise showing required is not answered by the opinion, and will likely be the
source of considerable argument.
134. But see Hornsby v. St. Louis, Southwestern Ry., 963 F.2d 1130, 1136 (8th Cir. 1992)
(Arnold, C.J., dissenting) (interpreting Franklin to mean that compensatory damages are
automatically available under 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1988) without analysis of legislative history,
congressional intent or the sufficiency of other remedies).
135. 787 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1992).
136. Id.
137. The court only made fleeting reference to the unique legislative history which sur-
rounds Title IX, Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act.
138. Tanberg, 787 F. Supp. at 972.
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